CRITICAL POINTS IN WARD'S PURE SOCIOLOGY

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The death of Professor Lester F. Ward, April 13, 1913, took from the ranks of American sociologists one of its greatest contributors and creators, and, at the same time, one of the world's greatest sociologists and scientists. His exact place in the history of human thought cannot now be determined; neither can his rank as a sociologist, because of the operation of the principle which he himself so frequently emphasized, and which he named "the illusion of the near." But that his ultimate standing in sociology will be conspicuously eminent few students of his works will deny. Many there are who would accord him first place. His writings are so characterized by intellectual voluminousness, profundity of philosophical grasp, keenness of scientific penetration, universality of knowledge, and power and fecundity of expression, that the reader is conscious of dealing with the system and ideas of a truly master mind.

I have specifically limited myself in this paper to a discussion of the critical points in that division of Ward's system of sociology which he called pure sociology. The exposition of his system as a whole, indicating what his great contributions to the science of sociology are, would be a more delightful task. But this particular piece of critical work has been needed and I regret that the carrying-out of other scientific tasks has postponed till now the execution of this long-contemplated paper. On some of the points raised I have often desired to have Professor Ward express himself. It is probable that no one more than he would have welcomed a well-founded criticism of his system. Certainly it is far from my intention to detract from his greatness or in any manner to reflect on the profound worth of the contributions he left behind him.

THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY

Ward's position in *Pure Sociology* relative to the origin of society is a reflection and essentially a continuation of the one he

espoused in *Dynamic Sociology*. As a prelude to discussing the origin of society, the origin of man is treated in each of those works, but while treating polygenism with some respect in the latter (I, 465[1]), he emphatically insisted on a monogenistic beginning (*Pure Sociology*, p. 194), dubbing polygenism a "purely theological conception."

The maturing, defining, and formulating of his idea of achievement, conceiving it to be the subject-matter of sociology, gives to his later consideration of the origin of society a more formally intellectualistic character than is apparent in his earliest treatment, although his view of origin remained essentially the same. In *Dynamic Sociology*, in the primary sense society is "simply an association of individuals." This is roomy enough to take in animals, which are said to be gregarious. But since man's immediate ancestors lived in solitary pairs, or in small groups, as he emerged man could have possessed no innate social sentiments. The scarcity of food and the conflict over food would make prehuman society impossible by decimating life and reducing it to solitary existence. Only when brain development became sufficient to enable man to see the advantage of "larger association" did society become possible. In the meantime man's nature underwent a transformation. Humanity was generated. Morals arose out of reason and sympathy. Society began, then, with the birth of humanity, which overcame the original anti-social state (*Dynamic Sociology*, I, 450–66).

In Ward's latest writings the origin of society rests upon the advent of achievement. Animals have no society because they do not achieve. The environment controls them, while with the birth of achievement man began to control the environment (*Pure Sociology*, p. 16), and his domination of nature has proceeded as far as he has achieved. Since sociology studies society, and since, it is maintained, achievement is the subject-matter of sociology, we are forced to infer that there could have been no society prior to the appearance of achievement. This arises where mere imitation and repetition end, for achievement "is anything and

[1] See, also, page 423 of the same volume, where he indicates that the monogenistic origin has been amply proved.

everything that rises above mere imitation and repetition" (*ibid.*, p. 25). Animals never rise above the imitative stage (*ibid.*, p. 433). "So-called animal societies" are "produced by reflex and instinctive forces" (*ibid.*, p. 29). And, as we shall see under the discussion of statics and dynamics, Ward even regards bona fide society as having arisen with the "metasocial" stage of social evolution.

If we agree that achievement (as he conceived it) constitutes the subject-matter of sociology, we are forced to accept Ward's position relative to the origin of society. But should we modify the concept achievement so that it may include simple social products as well as highly rational ones; or should we insist that the social content consists of the psychical interactions of associating individuals, as many sociologists maintain, the case would be different. Later in this paper I shall deal with his conception of achievement in particular. Now it is sufficient to indicate that we are warranted in placing the origin of society at the point where intelligence dawns. This carries it back into the animal world. After the purely instinctive groupings are passed in evolution there is a mode of grouping which Baldwin properly denominates "plastic" (*American Journal of Sociology*, XV, 822). In such groups the young learn how to do things from the older associate group members. While social heredity operates by way of imitation for the most part, the animal young actually may be taught. I have witnessed the parents both of birds and of animals patiently teaching modes of action to the young. A considerable body of knowledge exists within the group which is passed down from generation to generation. Perhaps, in a modified sense of the term, the ways of acting which are learned by the young might be termed achievement.

It is difficult to conceive, therefore, how primitive man could have been anti-social. It is more logical to think that, in descending from ancestors which were social and in starting on the road of truly human development, man kept the social nature as a working capital than that the conflict over food and possessions drove him to an entirely solitary life and made of him an anti-social being. Did we concede that simians lead a practically solitary life, living in small groups of parents and offspring, which

I think is an extreme position when taken as a typical thing, the family life is quite sufficient to keep alive the social nature until conditions arise which permit of the existence of the larger kind of associational life.

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF SOCIOLOGY

In the chapter entitled "The Subject-Matter of Sociology" Ward engages in an elaborate discussion and exposition of achievement with a view to establishing it as the subject-matter of sociology. In his treatment of "conceptions of society" Professor Ellwood classes Ward's conception as that of the "science of human institutions." He rightly criticizes it for being too narrow because it leaves out of sight many social phenomena of which the sociologist must take account, such as "mobs, crazes, fads, fashions, and crimes," and "many instinctive actions which do not take on institutional forms." It is too broad in one way because other social sciences also deal with human institutions, though in a less general way than does sociology (*Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, p. 5).

My purpose is not so much to criticize Ward's conception in itself as it is to indicate certain inconsistencies in his development of it.

First, there is an essential change or shifting in the meaning of the term "achievement" which it is asserted constitutes the subject-matter of sociology. The initial statement represents achievement as an activity, society as made up of activities, and sociology as a science that concerns itself exclusively with functional matters. The "subject-matter of sociology is human *achievement*. It is not what men are but what they do. It is not the structure but the function. . . . . Sociology is concerned with social *activities*. It is a study of action, i.e., of phenomena, ... of how the various social products have been created. These products once formed become permanent" (*Pure Sociology*, pp. 15, 16). The functional character of achievement, the activital nature of society which consists of achievement, and the functional basis of sociology scarcely could be more emphatically stated. Further, it is evident that there is a wide distinction between achievement and its prod-

ucts which are later called achievements. However, this distinction is lost sight of in the same chapter and practically disappears from the remaining treatment of pure sociology. The ensuing quotations sufficiently reveal the lapse.

The products of achievement are achievements.

> All human institutions are achievements. The term *institution* is capable of such an expansion as to embrace all human achievement, and in this enlarged sense institutions become the chief study of sociologists. All achievements are institutions, and there is a decided gain to the mind in seeking to determine the true subject-matter of sociology, to regard human institutions and human achievement as synonymous terms, and as constituting, in the broadest sense of both, the field of research of a great science (*ibid.*, p. 31).

Now this may be a convenience but it is certainly a confusing one. The author of a grammar, after having made clear that action is denoted by verbs and objects by nouns, might as well say: "The term noun is capable of such an expansion as to embrace all verbs, since there is an advantage in regarding all activities as objects." But, to say the least, it would do anything save throw light on the subject-matter of grammar. It would seem that the product of an activity must be considered a structure, and hence that the products of achievement must be thought of as structural. Ward is perfectly logical in drifting into the structural interpretation of achievements, institutions, structures, but not into identifying the activity which produced them with the things produced. The distinction he draws between primary and secondary institutions, the former being termed institutions and the latter structures (*ibid.*, pp. 185 ff.), is not elsewhere regarded and evidently serves as an incident in his system.

Second, we find that achievement is made dependent on a process, or social activity. Thus social continuity, or social heredity, is the precondition of institutions. "Sociology, as distinguished from anthropology, deals mainly with the historic . . . . races because here alone is social continuity, the *sine qua non* of achievement. . . . . The essential characteristic of all achievement is some form of *knowledge*. But knowledge, unlike capacity, cannot be transmitted through heredity. . . . . As all achievement is knowledge, to be saved it must be transmitted

in some way. The process by which achievement is handed down may be aptly called social heredity," or social continuity (*ibid.*, p. 34).

This knowledge bears evidence of being structural in nature, since achievements consist of ideas, plans, devices, ways of doing things in society. Were achievement here regarded in its initial sense, as activity, or social function, it would be difficult to conceive how it could be handed down by a process. Achievement or achievements, as conceptual objects, are transmitted, but as social structures rather than as functions. They may be functions of individual minds but relative to society they are structures.

I believe it is obvious that Ward's conception of achievement, beginning as one relating to function, soon changed to one of structure. It is certainly true that in developing his doctrine of statics and dynamics he constantly makes use of achievement in the structural sense. And in his later volume, *Applied Sociology*, the substantive signification is evident, because there it is regarded as the product of individual genius which is to be submitted to a process of social appropriation. In neither connection would achievement as activity be appropriately used.

THE NATURE OF SOCIETY

The student of Ward could not fail to be impressed by the great attention which he pays to psychological matters. Seven out of the twenty chapters which make up *Pure Sociology* deal directly with the origin and nature of what he terms the two great agents of the social process, feeling and intelligence, and much of other chapters involves similar implications. That he believed society is psychical cannot be doubted. That he conceived its operations now to be chiefly of the instinctive sort and formerly much more so than now could only be inferred from the general impression which a perusal of that volume leaves. Yet it is paradoxical that a critical study of the mechanics of his system brings the conclusion that his system when interpreted according to the demands of its explicit formal foundations teaches that society is essentially rational and intellectual in its nature.

It is evident that sociology deals with society and that society is revealed in its phenomena. Now Ward tells us that social phenomena are *caused* by social forces (*Pure Sociology*, p. 256). This might raise the question: Are social forces social phenomena? We are not left in doubt as to the answer because he tells us, in developing his conception of the "subject-matter of sociology," what social phenomena are. "Sociology is concerned with *activities*. It is a study of action, i.e., of phenomena" (*ibid.*, p. 16). This gives no clew to what they are save that they are activities. But his great thesis is: "The subject-matter of sociology is *achievement*. It is not what men are but what they do" (*ibid.*, p. 15). But we have already been forced to conclude that while Ward began his treatment of achievement as a functional affair he soon identified it with social structure and continued to treat it as such.

Now it stands to reason that an author's conception of the nature of society will be revealed in the character of whatever he conceives to be the subject-matter of sociology. Hence I believe it is fair to infer that, according to the logic of the initial mechanism of Ward's system as he himself formulated it, the nature of society is exhibited in the nature of human achievement.

We have seen in a former connection what is involved in achievement. It is a highly intellectual product, being the creation of the rational faculty. According to this doctrine, then, society consists of achievement, and is a psychical object of a severely intellectual, rational character. Only once in the volume under consideration have I detected an indication that achievement, or structures, may be otherwise than psychical. Thus: "Structures are not necessarily material objects. . . . . Social structures may or may not be material" (*ibid.*, p. 185). There is nothing to indicate what is meant by this statement except in the assertion that achievement "is chiefly mental or psychical, but it may be physical in the sense of skill," the allusion being to the muscular feats of heroes (*ibid.*, p. 25). But even skill in its incipiency is not physical but mental because it consists of a series of related movements which must be conceived in order that they may be executed. It has often been demonstrated in gymnasium work that athletes taking up new activities, such as those of the horizontal bar, fail in their

execution until they are able to form a mental image and a "feel" of the bodily adjustment to be made at each important point of the series of movements.

What then are we to say of the emotions, the feelings, the desires, which Ward makes so much of and which he denominates the "social forces"? If they are "social forces" must they not be a part of the social phenomena and help establish the nature of society? Not if we are to remain true to the logic of the position which has been previously marked out. They may be necessary but they are on the outside of the social nature because achievement holds the center of the field. The social forces are only agencies which move men of brains to make achievements and other men to conserve them; but the achievements are social phenomena, institutions, structures. What place is left for feelings and desires? It may seem strange that this should be the case but we are only following the logic of the foundations of the system.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The background of Ward's classification of the sciences generally and of the social sciences specially is found in Comte's idea of classification and in his own development of the conception of filiation. Comte's scheme of classification on the basis of generality and complexity is considered sound. The natural order of the sciences, beginning with the most general and simple and proceeding successively through the less general and more complex to the least general and most complex, is mathematics (a normative science), astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology. This is the natural order because it is the order the mind is obliged to follow if it desires to understand fully the given sciences. The fundamental conception of a given science in the series is the foundation for understanding the science that follows. Ward is so strongly possessed by this idea that he would organize the educational system so as to inculcate the sciences in that order. Incidentally it is regarded as the order of the genesis of phenomena in the objective world. Spencer pursued the logical method in his classification scheme, regarding phenomena primarily rather

than the inwardness of the sciences themselves as the basis, and came out with practically the same order as Comte's.

Ward's additional reason for the serial classification is found in the doctrine of filiation. The sciences should be grouped in the above order because they grow out of each other just as do phenomena in nature. There is a principle of "universal chemism" operating in the world of events. According to this principle new and higher products are the synthetic results of the old and lower, unlike the old in form and properties; so much so in fact that an inspection of the old would never lead the untutored mind to predict the form and qualities of the new (*Pure Sociology*, chap. v). This chemical conception is applicable everywhere. Nature makes syntheses outside of chemical combinations. Organic life originated in this manner. Mind, at the appropriate time, appeared as the synthesis of biotic units. Society is a like synthesis, compounded out of ingredients resident in individuals.

The classification of the social sciences conforms to this principle. Sociology is the result of the

> recompounding of the simpler sciences. The sociological units are compounds of psychological units, but differ as much from their components as corrosive sublimate differs from chlorine or mercury. This principle explains the relation of sociology to the special social sciences. It is not quite enough to say that it is a synthesis of them all. It is the new compound which their synthesis creates. It is not any of them and it is not all of them. It is that science which they spontaneously generate. It is a genetic product, the last term in the genesis of science. The special social sciences are the units of aggregation that organically combine to create sociology, but they lose their individuality as completely as do chemical units, and the resultant product is wholly unlike any of them and is of a higher order. All this is true of any of the complex sciences, but sociology, standing at the head of the entire series, is enriched by all the truths of nature and embraces all truth. It is the *scientia scientiorum* [*Pure Sociology*, pp. 90–91].

Thus we find that sociology is an all-embracing science, spontaneously synthesized out of all sciences and the special social sciences in particular, less general and more complex than they, unlike them, of a higher order, the final head of the scientific series. This claim should satisfy the pretentions of the most predacious sociologist.

Now when we seek to discover just what is the relationship existing between sociology and the "special social sciences" in this system we get into a difficulty. Nor is it clear what relation those special social sciences bear to the sciences in general. In another work Ward says: "The special social sciences, then, are not themselves the science of sociology, but they constitute the data of sociology" (*Outlines of Sociology*, p. 36). As much is said in *Pure Sociology*. But in a general scheme of all sciences do they stand below sociology as more general and simpler sciences or above it as less general and more complex? The latter alternative seems to be excluded in Ward's treatment, since he calls sociology the "most complex science" (*Pure Sociology*, p. 46), and asserts that it heads the entire list of sciences (see quotation above). On the other hand, the other social sciences are called the "special social sciences" and since they go into the details of the various great subdivisions of social activity would naturally be regarded (according to the scheme in question) as more complex than sociology. But because, according to the doctrine, the more complex science is a synthesis of the units contained in the next less complex and because it is asserted the other social sciences furnish data for sociology, schematically they would be expected to precede sociology. Yet one rather feels that Ward does not regard them as more general sciences.

No doubt sociology is a synthesis of other sciences. But it is apparent that, since sociology has developed, other social sciences are treating it as data for themselves, i.e., abstracting units and points of view from it which they synthesize into themselves. We have witnessed such transformations in economics, psychology, ethics, political science, to a degree up to the present time, and probably are destined to see still further absorptions of the sociological concept. Good, fruitful ideas easily pass into circulation and become a part of the organizing equipment of the minds that work in cognate lines. Perhaps this is to be welcomed because it makes for the unity of the sciences.

The real scientific question is not whether sociology is higher or lower than the other social sciences but what is its function in the scientific undertaking as one among its brethren. It will

become established as a science among others as fast and as far as it discovers its specific division of labor. This will probably consist in showing how all the great streams of social activities enter into synthesis with each other, how the many lines of human interest get harnessed into a working copartnership, in unearthing and formulating the conditions and laws of progress relative to total society, and in developing principles of social control. In this sense, and perhaps in this sense alone, may sociology lay any claim to being the most general social science.

SOCIAL STATICS AND DYNAMICS

Altogether the most difficult part of the Wardian sociology is that which relates to social statics and social dynamics. Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* lacked the mechanism of system which was developed in *Pure Sociology* and hence escaped any difficulty of interpretation in the use it makes of the terms "statics" and "dynamics." "Statics," "passive dynamics," and "active dynamics" were the terms used in the former work to express in a general way what came to be expressed in the latter work by the terms "statics," "dynamics," and "telics." Thus it is said:

> The condition, or status, of society at the present time or at any past time is the problem of social *statics:* the *natural* progress, or movement, of society, the causes, origins, and genesis of its leading institutions, and the purely spontaneous changes which it has undergone, are problems of *passive,* or *negative,* social dynamics. . . . . The closing chapter of that volume [*Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I], though fairly entering on the field of social science, was purposely confined to the statical and passively dynamical conditions, which it was necessary to comprehend thoroughly before the more important but less understood problems of active social dynamics, or applied social science, could be intelligently stated and logically discussed [*Dynamic Sociology,* I, 456; II, 1–2].

These distinctions were carried out in an obvious and untechnical manner.

But in *Pure Sociology,* where Ward's system is matured and final, it is a really critical task to discover the relations existing between social statics and social dynamics. And when their actual relation has been ascertained certain discrepancies appear and the basis for the formulation is open to grave objections.

There can be no doubt that Ward regarded his conception and treatment of statics and dynamics as among his greatest contributions to sociology, for relative to both, in commenting on their consideration by Comte, he took pains to point out the profound advance he himself makes in their formulation (*Pure Sociology*, pp. 223–24). Besides this their treatment occupies about one-sixth of the total space devoted to pure sociology. Outside of his treatment of the classification of the sciences, this is by far the greatest amount of attention he devotes to developing the technical mechanism of his social philosophy.

In dealing with social statics and social dynamics, I shall first make an exposition of their essential features and then devote to their formulation some criticisms. Pursuant to that I cannot refrain from acknowledging the masterly treatment contained in the two chapters which are devoted to statics and dynamics and the great value of the many conceptions embodied in their presentation. From whatever point viewed, Ward's conception of social synergy is profound and his exposition of it is among his most masterly productions. But when a writer consciously seeks to construct a system which avowedly is an advance over those of its predecessors and when such attention is devoted to the perfection of its mechanism that the latter is made to occupy a conspicuous and vital position in the system, the system and the mechanism must be examined critically with a view to determining their consistency and validity.

Social statics and social dynamics have specific functions allotted to them in the age-long social drama. They are conceptual mechanisms in a system of social philosophy whose divisions of labor consist in the creation and transformation of social structures, or the establishment of social order and the production of progress. Both processes are comprehended under a larger division of sociology—social mechanics. It deals with the social forces in both their statical and dynamical aspects (*ibid.*, p. 145). Telics is the other main division of pure sociology.

The principle of synergy lies behind the operation of the social forces in the field of statics. This principle represents the coming together of conflicting forces in such manner that their direction

undergoes a gradual change by which they become co-operatively conservative and constructive. Ward seeks to demonstrate that synergy is a universal cosmical principle, accounting alike for the construction of celestial and terrestrial structures. In the social field, the social forces, which otherwise but for the operation of synergy would be kinetic, destructive agents, are brought into balance. During, and as a consequence of, this equilibration the social forces become constructive. Their creative synthetic function issues in structures and social order. Society is established (*ibid.*, pp. 175 ff.).

The statical character of structures arises out of the fact that functioning, growth, and simple perfectionment do not make determinative changes of type. All modifications of type occur under dynamics. Social function is to be regarded as quite as statical as structure. Physiology as a science is as statical as anatomy. Functions as such do not modify structures. They are not dynamic even where by excess they increase the quantity of life through growth and multiplication. Likewise simple perfectionment (Ward never illustrates what he means by it) so long as it does not alter the type of structure, is statical. The principle at work relative to social structures is the same as that in invention, biology, and psychology. The difference between the fields lies in the nature of the forces (*ibid.*, pp. 180–83).

Since social equilibration "works out social structures and conserves them," the process is one "of a struggle for structures" in which the fittest structures survive (*ibid.*, p. 184). It is not a quiescent process but one marked by intense activity. It is this "increased intensity" that constructs (*ibid.*, p. 222).

Social statics, like biological statics, is a theoretical science. It assumes the fixity of human institutions in order to study them. But there is no actual fixity. The social process is a continual flux in which transformations occur (*ibid.*, p. 224).

Social statics appears somewhat late on the scene in social evolution. It does not begin with the origin of the race. Man as man evolved and distinctive races were wrought out before it appeared. Not until men had dispersed, races had been differentiated, languages, customs, religion, ceremonies, etc., had formed,

population had increased mightily so that divergent groups again met but as hostile strangers, conflict and conquest had ensued and following it social assimilation involving crossing and combination of culture, did it emerge (*Pure Sociology*, pp. 193–203).

Further, social statics has its own distinctive domain. It is not to be confounded with social dynamics or any other science.

> To my own mind it would be impossible to conceive of a more definite branch of science than that of social statics as here presented. It cannot be confounded with any other science or domain of natural law, and we shall see in the next chapter that it is as clearly marked off from social dynamics as from all other sciences, although it is its natural prelude and its study is absolutely essential to the study of social dynamics, which cannot be understood without it as a basis [*ibid.*, 216].

Dynamics is a term which occupies a conspicuous place in Ward's sociology. Not only did it christen his first sociological work but it acquired deep significance in the mechanism of his matured philosophy. But in developing pure sociology the term undergoes a transformation of meaning. In *Pure Sociology* at least three distinct interpretations are necessary. In the earlier part of that work it has the general significance of force and movement. In formulating the mechanism of statics and dynamics its sense is specialized, covering the agency which disturbs the equilibrium of forces. These interpretations are consciously adopted by Ward. But in the latter portion of the volume he sometimes unconsciously drifts into the use of the term which comports with the usage common among sociologists, namely, any changing society or set of social conditions.

Since statics deals with the establishment of an equilibrium of social forces and the production of social order, it is evident that social dynamics must be something different. Equilibrium is still concerned but in the direction of disturbance and transformation. Social dynamics secures these results by means of long, gradual, differentiating processes. Therefore instead of being directed toward social order the treatment of social dynamics considers the processes of social progress. Its business is not fixity of type but fluidity and change of type. And since growth, functioning, and simple perfectionment do not secure structural transformation, something else must be invoked.

Dynamic phenomena can take place only after structures are formed. "Dynamic movements are confined to structures already formed and . . . . consist in changes in the type of these structures. . . . . It is a differential process and takes place by infinitesimal increments and changes" which are comparable to the transfer of matter in petrifaction (*ibid.*, p. 222). It involves some additional principle by which it is adjusted to the environment (*ibid.*, p. 221). As such it involves movement as distinguished from motion.

Dynamics also relates itself to the equilibrium of forces as manifested in the social order in a manner distinguishable from the relation statics bears. In statics the equilibrium is established and conserved. In dynamics the internal, intensive, differential movements influence the social order. The equilibrium, instead of being stationary, passes into a moving equilibrium. In this movement of the whole, progress is seen. Progress consists in such a transformation of structure and order that, instead of being broken down or impaired, they are not only sustained but improved. This improvement consists in a better adaptation to the environment. Hence in progress society gradually becomes possessed of a more efficient mechanism of adaptation. Ward's emphasis is on the mechanism rather than on the subjective content, that of satisfaction, or welfare.

Unlike statics, whose field of operation is dominated by but one principle, synergy, the dynamic field has three principles which produce the results seen in progress. The briefest statement of these principles and their functions may be quoted from Ward:

> These are, first, difference of potential, manifested chiefly in the crossing of cultures, and by which the equilibrium of social structures is disturbed, converting stability into lability; second, innovation due to psychic exuberance, through which the monotonous repetition of social heredity is interrupted, and new vistas are gained; and, third, conation, or social effort, by which the social energy is applied to material things, resulting in poesis and achievement. All these principles are unconscious social agencies working for social progress [*Pure Sociology*, pp. 231–32].

Ward's exposition of social statics and social dynamics is most likely to confuse the student until he has mastered the system; even then a confusion exists but it is observed to pertain to the system. It is almost as difficult to discover just what are the rela-

tions between statics and dynamics in his scheme as it is to penetrate Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and understand how the categories are related to the forms of time and space. A part of the trouble arises from the fact that it is not until social statics has been exposited in chap. x, and the second division of social dynamics in chap. xi has been reached, that the author's real idea of their schematic relationship emerges. Up to that point the reader is left to believe that he is pursuing a chronological account of the successive development of statics and dynamics. Yet when we reach this point we are met by this statement: "Social statics, like biological statics, is a theoretical science. It *assumes* [italics mine] the fixity of human institutions in order to study them." We find, then, that we are to take the relation of statics to dynamics as one of logic rather than as one of time. Although the announcement comes late it does clear up some of the anomalies which seemed to inhere in a chronological interpretation. For instance, we are told in the exposition of the dynamic principles that they have been in operation all the time; that, notwithstanding the fact that statics creates the equilibrium which we call the social order, those principles were already on the scene, busy at work, although their function is to secure a moving equilibrium, or social progress. When chronologically viewed it was really difficult to think of social differentiation having taken place, followed by collision of groups, conflict, conquest, and social integration, the last item alone constituting social statics, without the presence of the dynamic agent.

But the statement that statics is a purely theoretical conception does not remove all confusion. In the first place, there are indications that at times Ward himself thinks of the relation of dynamics to statics as chronological. The long-deferred statement that statics is to be conceived as purely theoretical indicates either this or that the author lapsed from his extraordinarily high rank as an expositor. And when the belated statement appears it bears the character of inconspicuousness and of being incidental to the elaborate treatment of statics and dynamics.

Second, great emphasis is laid on the fact that dynamics cannot occur until statics has built structural types on which the

former is to work. There cannot be a change of type until this type is established and the creation of this type is the function of statics. "No dynamic phenomena can take place until structures are formed." "Dynamic movements are confined to structures already formed." They consist "in changes in the type of these structures" (*op. cit.*, p. 222). I am entirely unable to attach any significance to these statements when taken in a logical sense only. They mean chronological succession or they mean nothing.

Third, the relation of type formation to type transformation. We are to remember that the principle of synergy accounts for structures by constructing an equilibrium of reciprocal and co-operative social forces out of mutually antagonistic and destructive ones; that this creation of structural types must precede their transformation under dynamics; and that this creation does not take place prior to, and is consummated in, the process of social assimilation. (For the latter part of the statement, *ibid.*, pp. 201–3.) Notwithstanding, the dynamic principles are supposed to operate during the building-up process of synergy. Thus Ward says: "We saw in it [statics] the working of the principle of synergy, equilibrating antagonistic social forces and constructing human institutions. We kept as completely out of view as possible the other and equally important point, viz., the simultaneous and concomitant working of the principle of the difference of potential" (*ibid.*, p. 236). Innovation also occurred specifically during social assimilation in the workings of the institution of slavery (*ibid.*, p. 244). Relative to it Ward makes this statement:

> The state of equilibrium established by social synergy in producing the old structures is converted into a moving equilibrium developing higher structures. Innovation is a part of this process, and is not to be considered as a separate movement. It is a partial explanation of how the changes take place. In studying it we simply go deeper into the details of the process and learn to distinguish the strictly dynamic from the wholly static elements of social activity [*ibid.*, pp. 247–48].

Conation is viewed in the same light. "Finally, in studying conation we proceed one step further in our analysis and seek to discover what it is that makes an action dynamic" (*ibid.*, p. 248).

Now the difficulty consists in understanding how the dynamic

principles are able to effect changes in types of structures while those types are in process of formation under statics. To call it a logical conception does not help much. There can be no doubt that Ward's exposition of statics is meant to identify the process of "assimilation" which succeeded the "protosocial" stage and introduced the "metasocial" stage with the synergistic creation of structure or types. Both chaps. x and xi explicitly and implicitly reflect this interpretation. The social order as such then arises for the first time. After showing how family, clan, patriarchal system, race, tribe, language, customs, ceremonies, religion, exogamy, etc., grew up, Ward remarks: "Such a state of things can scarcely be called a society, and yet it contained all the germs of a future society. This was the stage of differentiation" (*ibid.*, p. 201). But "at length a process of integration began. . . . . We are now to inquire by what process and according to what principle the latter was accomplished. At the very outset it is important to note that this principle is none other than that by which all organization takes place, viz., synergy" (*ibid.*, p. 203). Of conflict, which initiates integration, he says: "We at last have a true key to the solution of the question of the origin of society" (*ibid.*, p. 204).

Ward is far from clear as to what structures he has in mind in considering statics and dynamics, whether achievement in general or the particular achievements which more especially constitute the social organization. Both are spoken of and sometimes it is the one, sometimes the other that appears to be meant. But whether it is the one or the other or both can make no difference in the outcome since all achievements are held to be social institutions and therefore are structures (*ibid.*, p. 31). The great question or problem is one that pertains to the occurrence of static and dynamic principles at the same time. Perhaps this might not appear so difficult to conceive had we not been assured that types of structures must be worked out prior to their transformation; that the social order must get established before social progress can take place; that a stationary equilibrium must be constituted as a condition to securing a moving equilibrium. But the whole

distinction between statics and dynamics rests there. Everything revolves about, and centers in, types of structures. Type establishment means unprogressive, or stationary society; type transformation means progressive society. Type establishment means a process of building up a type and type transformation means working it over into a structure that involves a new principle of adaptation. How both establishment of type and its transformation may occur at the same time either chronologically or logically is past understanding.

Relative to the dynamic principles the question arises: What real difference is there between those of innovation and conation? Innovation is said to be the invention which was initiated by the leisure class but which occurs widely now, and conation is that part of desire or that desire which is directed toward the material environment and results in achievement, another name for invention. Innovation may be "psychical exuberance" and conation may be forced effort, yet each is a desire to achieve and the fruitfulness of each arises from the fact that its effort is expended on the material environment. Practically their only difference consists in the fact that originally some men achieved because they wanted to and others have achieved because they had to—distinctions so slight for sociological purposes that to apply the term "principle" to them is too great an honor.

The distinctions drawn between statics and dynamics do not uniformly result in clear ideas. What a change in type of social structures consists in Ward never illustrates. Indeed his nearest approach to an illustration relative to any kind of structure is that which refers to a patent on the improvement made to a previous invention. The patent is issued because a "new principle" is introduced. But in the organic and social world he is silent, which is all the more curious since both fields of phenomena are so extensively dealt with. Previous to "social integration" there were no types of structures, only "idea germs"; afterward types had arisen. But what Ward actually conceived to have happened to religion, language, government, etc., in the way of adding "new principles" is purely conjectural. I have always admired Ward's

system but have felt defeated whenever called upon to illustrate by concrete cases the distinction between his types of structures.

A similar difficulty arises in considering another side of the subject of type. Ward insists that progress consists in a change of type of structure. This is brought about by infinitely small changes which constitute the moving equilibrium. As we have seen, neither growth, function, nor simple perfectionment can account for a change of type (*Pure Sociology*, pp. 181–82). This is open to grave questioning. Both growth and perfectionment are put in the class of non-moving equilibriums. The syllogistic form of the argument employed by Ward to prove his case is this: Growth, functioning, and simple perfectionment cannot change type. Only moving equilibriums can do so. Hence they are not moving equilibriums. But I do not see why a growing child, or other growing organism, does not represent in the strictest sense a progressive balancing of forces. The same should hold true of "simple perfectionment" if it is perfectionment at all. For example, there must have been all stages of differentiation represented in the series of feet belonging to the forms which bridged the gap between man's simian ancestors and himself. The full series may perhaps be regarded as constituting a change of type in the Wardian sense. Now a small part of the series would doubtless be considered a case of "simple perfectionment." But if the whole series constitutes a moving equilibrium (it must be so in the Wardian sense because it actually changes type), why does not any portion of the series?

In Ward's treatment it is evident that strictly social structures emerge only after "social integration" has succeeded the period of conquest that initiates the "metasocial" stage of social evolution. It is of some importance to inquire in what the social content of that "protosocial" stage which endured hundreds of thousands of years prior to the "metasocial" period consisted. If social structures are the products of the "metasocial" period, what preceded them? If the balancing of social forces does not take place prior to that period when *primitive* social products were building, in what relation to each other were the social forces?

Instead of social structures we find Ward talking of original "idea" or "culture germs" as constituting the content of the "protosocial" stage. These *Anlagen* possess much social energy locked up within them which becomes freed and constructive through conflict and the consequent "social karyokinesis" (*op. cit.*, p. 236). One cannot but wonder why forces so locked up in language, religion, race, tribe, custom, etc., are not balanced and how they can be regarded as "kinetic"; also why unlocking them would not really render them "kinetic" and destructive in the truest sense. But according to Ward it is because of their "difference of potential" that through conflict their energy is unlocked and the process of equilibration takes place which issues in structural types. Hence there could have been no equilibrating process prior to integration through assimilation. It is only from his general doctrine of synergy that we are able to infer in what relation the preceding social forces were. According to that doctrine they were running to waste because they were kinetic rather than dynamic and constructive. "The motions that take place prior to equilibration, the unrestrained motions of all things in their primitive state, are kinetic. But these produce nothing. They are lost. . . . . Construction is only possible through equilibration. Statics does not imply inactivity or quiescence" (*ibid.*, p. 222).

Now if the protosocial state is characterized by the operation of kinetic forces it is inconceivable that the original "idea germs," or *Anlagen*, could have been formed. And there is a rather formidable array of such *Anlagen* enumerated as having been wrought out during the period of social differentiation (*ibid.*, pp. 199–201). Ward actually uses the term "equilibrium" relative to one of these, viz., race:

> A race of men may be looked on as a physical system possessing a large amount of potential energy, but often having reached such a complete state of equilibrium that it is incapable of performing any but the normal functions of growth and multiplication. It is reduced by the very principle that constructed it to the power of simple repetition. Under the head of social stagnation . . . . it was shown that most savage and barbarous races are actually in this stage [*ibid.*, p. 236].

Evidently the "equilibrium" is regarded as being of a physical rather than of a social character. But it is difficult to believe

that the accompanying social products can be regarded as purely physical products.

In another passage Ward concedes much of what, schematically, he reserves for late society to "protosocial" society:

> If savage man has come out of an animal state (Homo descended from Pithecanthropus), if barbaric man has come from savage man, if half-civilized man has come from barbaric man, if civilized man has come from half-civilized man, if enlightened man has come from early civilized man, then there has in the long run always been progress in spite of all the forms of degeneracy and all the rhythms to which this series of phenomena has been subjected [*ibid.*, p. 229].

Unless progress is used here in a very loose and unwarranted sense the earliest human society is credited with that which by the system under discussion is reserved for social dynamics. But social dynamics concerns itself with transformation of structures under a moving equilibrium of forces. And, as we have seen, dynamics is preceded by statics with its stationary equilibration.

Much of this confusion in Ward's system of sociology is due to the hard-and-fast position held relative to achievement as constituting the subject-matter of sociology and to the attempt to build a sociological system on the analogy of physical mechanics. To rule out all of the early social products such as clan, tribe, family, religion, race, etc., from having a place in the list of achievements is an arbitrary procedure which sacrifices facts to system. The same must be affirmed of the refusal to view those phenomena as the products of social forces which operated in a manner similar to those in more recent society. That he sought to make society begin with the "metasocial" stage is an indication that he was unduly influenced by the social conflict school of sociologists, as is also his position which glorifies the benefits of war in times of civilization and enlightenment.

WAR

On the place and function of war in society Ward underwent a change of heart between the publication of his *Dynamic Sociology* and his *Pure Sociology*. In the former work he viewed standing

armies and war as inimical to civilization and as a means of exploitation of the masses of people by the privileged classes and the governing few (*Dynamic Sociology*, II, 237–38). He did not believe, however, that war can be abolished until the reform is introduced on the side of the offensive instead of the defensive, otherwise non-resistance would be fatal. The mistake of "peace reformers" consists in "supposing that peace can be maintained except by the very threat of war, so long as the war spirit prevails in any considerable portion of mankind" (*ibid.*, I, 648). Doubtless the appearance of the sociology of conflict which he later gives so much weight in the origin and evolution of society accounts for his change of position. For in *Pure Sociology* he defends war and deprecates the attitude of peace advocates.

Ward, as we have seen, calls conflict the "true key" to the problem of the origin of society. It is "the only scientific explanation that has been offered of the facts and phenomena of human society." It is both a true natural principle and a universal one, and illustrates "simple and typical social synergy" (*Pure Sociology*, pp. 203–4).

Not only is conflict regarded as essential to account for the origin of society, thus having a large place in social statics, but it is likewise necessary to social progress, which social dynamics accounts for. "When races stop struggling progress ceases. They want no progress and they have none. For all primitive and early, undeveloped races, certainly, the condition of peace is a condition of social stagnation" (*ibid.*, p. 238). What is true of backward peoples is practically true of civilized ones. The advanced peoples are compounds of many crossings of culture by reason of successive conquests. Consequently they have the highest social efficiency and constantly extend their domain over the backward peoples of the globe. But this is only another form of conquest and "differs not the least in principle" from the principles laid down in the treatment of conflict (*ibid.*, p. 239). "Under the operation of such a cosmical principle it seems a waste of breath to urge peace, justice, humanity, and yet there can be no doubt that these moral forces are gaining strength and slowly mitigating the severity of the law of nature. But mitigation is all that can be hoped for." Most

of the peace agitation is "characterized by total blindness" to all the "broader cosmic facts and principles." It is our "over-culture," the "mark of an effete mind," "maudlin sentimentality, and inconsistent sympathy." Could peace missionaries have their way there would be an end to progress (*ibid.*, pp. 239–40).

Were a writer the inhabitant of a warring state in the midst of a warring group so that his historical perspective had been swamped by the pressure of contemporaneous conditions, this position might not appear unnatural. But in the case of a man who was the citizen of a peaceful state, living in an enlightened age, and cognizant of the whole field of social facts, the position seems strange indeed. Without standing sponsor for "peace missionaries" it is important that we should examine this doctrine impartially.

First, Ward's illustrations of the benefits of conquest on the part of advanced nations in modern times are unfortunate for his position, since the very features which, according to his exposition of conflict, are progress-giving were absent. Conquest and assimilation, in order to prove beneficial, must occur between peoples of about the same culture stage. "The only kind of social assimilation that is increasingly fertile, is that between races that occupy substantially the same social position" (*ibid.*, p. 215). But the primitive peoples with which the advanced nations have dealt are little compounded or are not compounded at all. Hence if fusion with them takes place, according to the theory, it could not prove fruitful. Ward admits their backwardness and unfruitfulness but still insists that their conquest truly represents the conflict theory (*op. cit.*, p. 239).

Again it must be said that there is very little real fusion between such backward peoples and their civilized conquerors. Generally the inferior race or people is pushed out and displaced; or it may be retained as a ward of the superior nation to be gradually assimilated physically rather than culturally. This has been the case with the American Indians. It would be extreme to assert that there has been anything like a "crossing of cultures" between the whites and Indians in North America.

Second, when it is claimed that conflict between advanced

nations today is the prime condition of progress the eyes are blinded by a theory and the mind is oblivious to the obvious facts of the modern period of history. It is sufficient to inquire: What conflict in modern times between such peoples has resulted in conquest, subordination of the one to the other in its territory, and a long process of amalgamation of culture? It would be difficult to find such a case on the part of leading nations.

There have been almost innumerable conflicts in modern times and some that have occurred were gigantic and profound. Territories have been shifted from one state to another. But modern history has been characterized by the existence of states which, resting on a definite territorial basis, have presented distinct national personalities and externalized themselves relative to each other. The movement of an integral people out of its geographical location, its invasion and conquest of another such people, and the physical and cultural absorption of either the victors or the conquered by the other, or the amalgamation of the two cultures, cannot be said to have taken place, among peoples who have been in the mid-current of western civilization, since the Norman invasion of the eleventh century.

Language and race loyalty have proved almost insurmountable barriers to the assimilation of a people, even where territorial incorporation has taken place. The recrudescence of political aspirations of present slavic inhabitants of Austria and Germany clearly distinguishes the method of incorporation of a people from that of conquest, consequent slavery, and other stages of social assimilation which the conflict theory involves. Germany absorbed Pomerania and Schleswig-Holstein, but their cultures were essentially identical with its own. It incorporated Alsace and Lorraine, yet the inhabitants and literature of the latter, though not the language, have remained chiefly French. Russia incorporated Siberia but has sent little of her population and culture into the incorporated region. Changes of territory have taken place as a result of the recent Balkan conflict but the states involved are admittedly feudal and medieval in their social systems, having been practically untouched by western progress. These are but a few of the instances of the modern method of conquest as dis-

tinguished from the earlier one which was followed by approximately complete amalgamation.

The method by which the modern world takes and utilizes the undeveloped regions of the earth is seizure and colonization. It is seizure rather than conquest because backward peoples are unable to make anything like effectual resistance to the advance of the great powers. It is colonization instead of assimilation since, as has been previously stated, the civilized peoples do not merge culturally with the undeveloped inhabitants but exterminate, displace, and localize them as wards. The new territory of which the natives have been dispossessed is settled by migrants from the exploiting nation and organized as dependent colonies into the governmental scheme of the parent society.

If this is true, the crossing of cultures, which has certainly gone on in an increasingly voluminous and fruitful manner in modern times and which has contributed so largely to human progress, must have had other agencies than conflict to promote it. In fact the great communicating and teaching agencies which have developed within the period are quite sufficient to take care of and promote the crossing of culture. Therefore it must be said that while Ward's application of the philosophy of conflict to backward peoples is mostly justified, his assertion that war is the fundamental condition of progress in civilized and enlightened times is unwarranted and untrue.

SLAVERY AND LABOR

In his latest conception of slavery Ward views it in its relation to the genesis of labor in the economic sense of the term. The modern man possesses the ability to carry on sustained labor. The work of the world is performed continuously and systematically for the sake of production. Primitive men may perform work but it is likely to be of a sporadic character. The mass of primitive people are not organized into a systematic body of producers. Ward contends that they do not labor because they are not disciplined. To secure this discipline it is necessary that the mass of the people shall be compelled to work under long, masterful coercion. Because there is no other institution or agency

which is capable of supplying this disciplinary training slavery is conceived to meet the need. It therefore becomes a fruitful and justifiable institution relative to the stage of evolution in which it occurs. "The capacity to labor is a typical 'acquired character' that has been transmitted in minute additions from parent to offspring and from generation to generation of slaves, until great numbers of men were at last born with a 'natural' or constitutional power to apply themselves to monotonous tasks during their whole lives" (*Pure Sociology*, p. 272).

Further, the institution in its origin is associated with conflict. Slavery is the third mode of treatment which the conquered race is subjected to, the preceding modes having been extermination and cannibalism. Since conflict is the "true key" to the origin of society and slavery is a factor in its processes, the inevitableness of the institution is apparent (*ibid.*, pp. 204–5). In fact modern industry could not have come into existence without it. "And right here is a corollary which Mr. Spencer and other critics of militancy have failed to draw. For slavery, as they admit, is the natural and necessary outcome of war. It is the internal step in the 'régime of status.' It was therefore in militarism that the foundations of industrialism were laid in social adaptation. There seems to be no other way by which mankind could have been prepared for an industrial era." But if this is too extreme, "it is at least true that this is the particular way in which men were fitted for the rôle that they have been playing in the last two centuries" (*ibid.*, p. 272).

Two distinct questions arise out of Ward's position relative to slavery and labor: Is conflict the sole cause of slavery, and is slavery the sole cause of labor? The reply to the first question is found simply in an appeal to fact. Spencer sufficiently showed that there have been various methods other than war of securing slaves, such as selling children and other relatives, kidnaping, enslavement of the debtor, and condemning the criminal to slavery (*Principles of Sociology*, Part VIII, chap. v). It is to be admitted, however, that war has been the chief method employed in the establishment of slavery.

The other question demands a different kind of answer. In this

connection it is interesting to note that in his earlier writings on sociology Ward occupied a different position relative to slavery. He then regarded it as but one of the means for securing the discipline which labor involves and severely condemned Spencer for arguing in favor of its exclusive rôle in that capacity (*Dynamic Sociology*, I, 541). Whether rightly or wrongly the sociology of conflict came to dominate his mind and the necessity of slavery appeared as a consequence.

The writings of recent investigators of the capacity of primitive man throw some light on his interests and ability. The older writers underrated his ability, interpreting his backwardness as being due to innate incapacity. Spencer necessarily imputed to him the qualities of childishness, emotionalism, and fickleness, because he applied to him the standards of civilization rather than those of his own primitive cultural stage. Ward specifically reflects this attitude in his treatment of slavery, although the logic of his general position that circumstances are the potent factors in the development of individuals looks in the opposite direction. He specifically states that the difference between civilized and uncivilized man is less inherent than in things (*Pure Sociology*, p. 17). Both Thomas and Boas have shown that the mental organization of primitive man is practically identical with that of civilized man, and that, measured in terms of their cultural conditions, they have relatively equal strength of attention, inhibition, originality, and generalization (Thomas, *Sex and Society*, pp. 25 ff.; Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, chap. iv).

The persistence of primitive man's activity in the direction of his interests is abundantly evidenced by those who have lived among primitive peoples and who have observed them without prejudice. Thus Boas states that in his own contact with the very Indians whom Spencer's informant cited as unpersistent and childish in their attention and interest they often wearied him first in considering matters which involved their interest. My colleague, Dr. O. G. Libby, testifies that, in his capacity as secretary of the State Historical Society of North Dakota, his years of contact with various Indian tribes led him to the same conclusion. One illustration may be offered. He held a conference which lasted a

week and which was devoted to securing the Arikara's account of the "Custer Massacre," in which the elder Indians had taken part. Each day's proceedings began in the morning and continued till ten or eleven o'clock at night. At the end of the week, to the suggestion that the conference had better end as they might be tired, the Indians responded: "We are not tired. But if you are tired we had better stop."

The point of all this is that without slavery as an agency, with the mental capacity for sustained interest, primitive men would have worked out their labor system gradually and as fast as proper incentives accumulated. Especially as money, as an instrument of value and exchange, was developed, the items of wages and especially profits would make their appeal. It is certainly true that many primitive peoples living in what Ward calls the "proto-social" stage developed inventions and technology to a considerable extent and laid the foundations of an industrial and labor system. Thus the Indians of British Guiana interchange manufactured products, different tribes engaging in special lines of production which their environment or technical achievement enables them to carry on to advantage for exchange with the others (Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, article by Büchner, pp. 116–17).

It is assumed that slavery furnished the discipline for the development of the captured hordes into a labor mass. It is pertinent to inquire at what point in the process of social evolution discipline as an attained ability entered. The captors are assumed to possess it, otherwise it could not be imposed on the captured. From whom did the captors obtain it? This really starts a baffling series of preconditions which reach their end in the conclusion that either some group of people of itself worked out the system of discipline which they proceeded to impose upon other people, and the consequent composite people in turn on others, or that discipline could have arisen by means of other agencies than slavery.

Ward's statement that discipline is an "acquired character" which was gradually built up by means of transmission from parents to offspring is open to question. It is safe to say that present-day biologists would almost unanimously reject it as an

impossible mode of accounting for labor. It is generally held by biologists that acquired characters cannot be transmitted. Accepting their statement as true, the disciplining force of slavery must have been exercised only in the lives of each particular generation of individuals.

CASTE

According to Ward, caste was as much the product of conflict as was slavery. Indeed he appears to regard it as exclusively the product of conquest (*Pure Sociology*, p. 206). The two races which were forced to occupy the same territory, the conquered as the slaves of the victors, regarded each other with prejudice and hostility. Generations must ensue before a fusion of the two into one people could take place. This separation into servile and non-servile classes is what constituted castes, and marks the origin of caste. It would seem that all succeeding castes are to be regarded as lineal descendants of those original castes which arose during the period of social assimilation when society itself is considered by Ward to have originated.

But is there no other principle or principles operating in society which are capable of generating caste? Has there never been a social stratification which amounted to a caste system which was not the product of conquest and social assimilation? Are the hard-and-fast classes which exist in England today the consequences of conflict of a military nature? There are in the British Isles several social strata between which there is practically no intermarriage and no conventional social intermixture. These classes do not coincide with the several ethnic elements out of which the people of Great Britain have, at different times, been compounded. Such a coincidence should occur were the stratifications the products of the conquests of the past.

Further, it is obvious that forces are working in the United States which if not checked by the operation of other forces which are strictly modern would in due time organize our population into distinct and inflexible classes. Were the wealthy class not continuously recruited from below it would become exclusive and aristocratic. Self-individualization, the desire to stand out in distinction relative to the masses of people, the adoption of badges

and titles of distinction, the effort to put into the possession of one's children the wealth, social standing, and privileges that have been gained by parents, are principles which if left to act alone would be sufficient in a few generations to create social castes.

ROMANTIC LOVE

In the course of an extended treatment of the phylogenetic forces of society Ward has occasion to consider the nature of sex relations. The sexual instinct, which he terms "natural love," together with its derivative and associate manifestations, is given much attention. Since we are concerned with but one of these manifestations, that of "romantic love," the other forms of love will be dismissed with the remark that in a general sense they are considered by Ward as the genetic products of the mating instinct.

I have no objection to make relative to Ward's demarkation and characterization of romantic love. The whole subject might be regarded as a mere incident of his system were it not for the fact that it is made to account so fundamentally for the position of woman in modern society. Romantic love is regarded both as a cause and as an effect. Certain episodes in historical development initiated it. In its turn it brought about a transformation in the sex relations, distinctively elevating the position of woman.

We must recall that in Ward's philosophy early society was characterized by a universal system of matriarchy wherein woman actually dominated the situation. It was not a case of mere maternalism, i.e., of handing down names through the mothers, but of bona fide governmental sovereignty, a gynecocracy. Up to this time females had chosen their male consorts and the latter had previously and during a long period of biological evolution been elevated from the position of parasitic appendages of the female organism to one of independence and equality by gyneclexis. But in the midst of the matriarchal system something eventuates. The male, under gyneclexis and male rivalry, had become superior to the female in physical strength. He also had shared in the general brain development of the race. The stage of social evolution, moreover, guaranteed no ethical insight or scruples in the relations of the sexes. Hence in this setting, accord-

ing to Ward, man's function in procreation, about which all had been ignorant previously, was discovered. Realizing his true relationship to the children, man proceeded to take control of them by means of his superior strength. Being stronger than woman and without ethical scruples, he overturned the gynecocratic order, subordinated woman along with children to his own selfish purposes, and so established the androcratic system.

Without attempting to make an extended criticism on this point it should be said that Ward doubtless errs in hypothecating the existence of a general matriarchal system in the early evolution of society. I believe Westermarck succeeded in overthrowing that theory. Further, the couvade as vestigeal is employed to demonstrate the passage of society from the gynecocratic to the androcratic stage. But practically, if not absolutely, all known primitive people know the paternal part in procreation although many of them live under a maternal system. Besides, the couvade may be interpreted as a mystic sign of sympathetic union between husband and wife (Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, pp. 104 ff.; also *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, II, 635–36).

The androcratic system with all its subjection of woman is held to have persisted, pervaded as it was by the absence of any higher form of love than natural or sex instinct, until the institution of chivalry in the Middle Ages gave birth to romantic love. Then fanned and energized by the religious fervor and kindred emotional phenomena of the age, romantic love emancipated the women of the upper classes from their brutal subjection and established an ideal in society which, caught up and heightened by romantic literature, has operated to ameliorate the condition of women in all advanced nations.

It is a historical fact, I believe, that a higher form of sex affection made its appearance during the Middle Ages, that it exhibited its force chiefly in the direction of woman, and that it has had much to do with the improvement that has gradually taken place in her social position. The issue that is raised is concerned with the nature of the method by which romantic love was introduced and perpetuated.

As brain development accounts for the rise of humanity, a

change in brain structure and nerve organization, so Ward holds, is the primary cause of the appearance of romantic love, as it is of other social advances. Not only increase in brain mass but qualitative brain changes are responsible for social evolution. In later times the latter method is the more important. "Since the period of social assimilation this has undoubtedly been the principle advance that has been made. The cross-fertilization of cultures worked directly upon these qualitative characters, rendering the most thoroughly mixed races, like the Greeks and the English, highly intelligent." The general aspects of these changes are said to be known: increase in number of "neurons," "extension and ramification of the plumose panicles that proceed from the summit of these pyramidal cells, and by the character of the axis cylinder at their base." Besides this, "it is altogether probable that a process of qualitative improvement has also and at the same time been taking place in the entire nervous system, and especially in the great centers of emotion [he probably refers to the sympathetic system as he does elsewhere], and if the serious study of these plexuses could be prosecuted, as has been that of the brain, differences would in all probability be detected capable of being described, as this has been done for the brain" (*Pure Sociology*, p. 391).

Two questions are raised relative to this position. First, how much do we actually know about the evolution of brain and nervous structures during the historic period? Second, is it necessary to assume such neural transformations in order to account for the rise of romantic love? The ethnologists and sociologists who have given specific attention to the brain in its relation to social development do not entirely agree with Ward. I have cited the position of Boas and Thomas in a previous connection to the effect that the improved technique of society rather than neural transformation accounts for the difference between the mind of primitive and that of civilized man. Deniker holds much the same position when he says: "The secret of civilization lies not so much in efforts of isolated individuals as in the accumulation of these efforts, in the transmission from one generation to another of the acquired result, of a sum-total of knowledge which enables each generation to go farther" (*Races of Men*, pp. 125–26). But he also thinks there

may have been a refinement of brain structures, although there is no way to demonstrate it at present (*ibid.*, p. 104). Doubtless we should expect a gradual refining process to take place in the course of evolution, but this must be almost imperceptible during recent historic times.

Relative to the part the sympathetic nervous system plays in developing and reservoiring emotional power, it must be said that Ward's position is largely conjectural. It has been demonstrated that this system is more closely associated with the central nervous system than was formerly supposed, that it carries the major part of efferent nerve currents relative to the brain while the central system conducts the major portion of the afferent, and that it extends its postganglionic fibers to various portions of the alimentary canal from mouth to anus, to part of the genital organs both internal and external, to the unstriated muscles which operate hairs, to muscles, glands, and blood vessels of the skin, and to the iris muscles and blood vessels of the eyeballs (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., XXVI, 288). In so far as the nervous system may be considered a reservoir of emotional force the sympathetic system obviously shares in this respect with the central system. In one particular Ward's conjecture is happy, since it is seen that the sympathetic system controls the genital organs. His argument is directed toward romantic love, but since natural love is bound to be the foundation of the later form of love it comprehends the latter in an indirect manner.

The chief criticism of Ward's position is to be directed toward the second question. While certain social events are made responsible for precipitating the advent of romantic love, it is supposed that those events met an immediate response in the way of brain and nerve transformations, and that romantic love was then transmitted to later generations by way of heredity. This would seem to be an unnecessary assumption because there is a simpler and more apparent explanation. Were Ward's position true, we should be forced to explain every great change of front and point of view which society undergoes by an appeal to brain and nerve changes. But profound feelings are generated on the part of the members of society relative to numerous issues and with comparative fre-

quency. Man's nervous organization has been the agency and depository of emotional stress during the ages, accustomed to the surges of the storms of feeling that sweep the organism from time to time. The channels and reactions were long ago fashioned and perfected so that there is little reason for believing that recent emotional disturbances produce any considerable effect on the physiological mechanism. Theoretically, use and disuse of parts may produce slight changes in the life of the individual, but, as we have seen, these changes are in the nature of acquired characteristics and are not transmitted to offspring.

What really seems to have been the case concerning romantic love is that it was a mental attitude which society adopted at a given time in the history of Europe under sufficient stimulus and conditions which were peculiarly appropriate to produce it. It involved a particular manner of regarding woman, and like all ideas touched by the reproductive instinct, was motived by a wealth of emotion. The idea was embodied in the ceremonies of the knightly order and in songs of troubadours and was thus enabled to fasten itself on the age by means of a spectacular and imaginative appeal. All that was needed to fashion natural love into romantic love was the idealization of woman. The long absences of knights from home as they went upon distant campaigns and crusades, coupled with the religious fervor of the age, was peculiarly fitted to furnish the ideal factor.

The transmission to succeeding generations of the higher and more ideal point of view regarding woman does not require to be conceived in a manner different from the transmission of other ideas and points of view. It is an instance of transmission by social heredity rather than by physical inheritance.

There are certain other conceptions contained in Ward's formulation of pure sociology which deserve consideration and perhaps criticism. Some of these are the sympodial method in evolution, the creation of the male by the female, advocacy of the *laissez-faire* policy relative to the social evil, the nature of the social forces, and attractive legislation. Perhaps all of these save the two last mentioned might be considered as incidental to the system rather than as fundamentally involved in it. Professor Hayes has made an

extended and able criticism of Ward's conception of the social forces, obviating any demand for special attention now (see *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, V, 77 ff.).

Very brief attention may be paid to attractive legislation. This is a method which is suited to realizing "social improvement," to which Ward devotes the last chapter of his *Pure Sociology* and the whole of *Applied Sociology*. It consists in constructing laws by the state with due reference to the nature of the social forces and of human nature, so that, instead of being compelled by force to obey them, members of society will find their realization lies in the direction of their own selfish interests.

"The social inventor has only to make sure what will constitute a greater gain or marginal advantage and to devise measures that will harmonize this with the social good, in order to secure with unerring certainty such a course of action on the part of all affected by the measures as will secure the end sought" (*Pure Sociology*, p. 570). It is the business of legislators, statesmen, and judges to make themselves masters of a knowledge of the social forces and of methods of their control in order to direct society without friction for the greatest good of all. It is the business of the sociologist to expose the nature and to formulate the laws of the social forces as a propadeutic to the work of lawmakers and administrators (*ibid.*, p. 569).

The first question to arise is whether a study of the social forces, in the Wardian sense, or a study of the conditions which produce the social evils that are to be removed, will yield the best results in the way of social control and direction. While it is recognized that a deeper knowledge of the psychology of man, both individually and collectively, would yield certain advantages, it is to be doubted if alone it is competent to bestow legislative or administrative prescience. It is more reasonable to believe that an apprehension of the actual producing conditions in any given case, the dissemination of the information pertaining to the situation to the public generally, and the framing of laws which demand the removal of adverse conditions, depending on the moral sanity and the sentiment of justice resident in the citizenship to support the execution of the laws, is the most efficient method of approach. Sometime

statistics may reveal the exact order of the occurrence of social phenomena or conditions. But it will be by the collection and systematization of facts relative to recurring conditions rather than by an immediate study of forces as such that anticipation and control are to be secured. So far as we have gone the greatest gains in democracy have come from appealing to the electorate on the basis of the information of conditions.

The second query relates to a matter of consistency in the ultimate working of Ward's scheme. His panacea for the alleviation of social ills and securing social improvement is universal education. The equalization of intelligence so that the members of society may become able to control and appropriate human achievements is fundamental to his system. This is the one great, pressing theme of his *Applied Sociology*. But in addition to this, although not logically or organically connected with it in Ward's system, is "social invention," or "attractive legislation." Both *Pure Sociology* and *Applied Sociology* end with a development of the idea.

It may be admitted that so long as the mass of a citizenship remains unintelligent, in the hands of patriotic and beneficent lawmakers and administrators a prescient knowledge of the social forces would work to the advantage of society. It equally follows that if the rulers were selfish and unethical society would suffer. But the inconsistency between the two ideas in their ultimate operation consists in the fact that as fast as universal education, or equalization of knowledge, is realized there is left a more restricted scope for legislating attractively. Universal education involves the bestowal of a knowledge of the social forces and of human nature upon the masses of citizens as well as upon the legislators. In so far as citizens do not have this insight into society the great object for which Ward contends so valiantly, namely, social improvement of the most thorough kind, fails of realization. But if men attain this comprehension of the workings of society they will be able to penetrate the veil of legislation and to thwart that class of legislation which is based solely on the principle of seducing people into compliance therewith.